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Summary
This article gives an overview of the three main mutually exclusive ethno-
national narratives developed during and after the war (1992–1995) in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina through one of the main instruments of memory politics, 
i.e., monuments, which have been erected in large numbers in the last two 
decades. Through the analysis of symbols, shapes and inscriptions, the aim is 
to show how war monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina serve as instruments 
of nation-building processes, i.e., strategies of identity consolidation and how 
they function as “containers of symbolism”. Unlike in the other Yugoslav suc-
cessor states, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is more than one nation-build-
ing project, with two being related to the “outside motherlands”, Serbia and 
Croatia, and one to the state. After a general overview of the memorialization 
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its political and legal frameworks, the 
author focuses on war monuments and narratives of the three ethno-national 
groups and gives some examples of monuments that represent the fourth, civ-
ic, or “unconstituent” narrative, which is very rare and marginal. 
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Introduction
In the last decades of the twentieth century, there was an unprecedented “return of 
the past”. According to John Keane, “crisis periods also prompt awareness of the 
crucial political importance of the past for the present” (1988: 204). This was espe-
cially prominent in the East, where “there has been a process of a ... (catching-up) 
nation-building, for which often a more distant past has been invented. Where na-
tional collective memories have been increasingly ‘desacralized’ and democratized 
in the West, there seems to be a desperate need for founding myths – just as there 
was after 1945 – in the East” (Müller, 2002: 9). New states needed new pasts and 
new identities and the “invention of tradition” would have been less dramatic if it 
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was not followed by genocide and persecution (Kuljić, 2005: 22). Moreover, as 
the Norwegian scholar Pål Kolstø writes, the third wave of nation-building, which 
took place with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, had much shorter 
timespans and more prominent direct and indirect methods of identity consolida-
tion, within which the construction and manipulation of symbols and rituals have 
been playing increasingly crucial roles (2014: 4). Nowhere was this more obvious 
than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former Yugoslav state with a very complex eth-
nic structure, which experienced the worst political and identity crisis due to the 
devastating war of 1992–1995. 
The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the three mutually exclusive 
ethno-national narratives developed during and after the war in Bosnia and Herze-
govina through the analysis of one of the main instruments of memory politics, i.e., 
monuments, which have been erected in large numbers in the last two decades. The 
goal is to show how war monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina serve as instru-
ments of nation-building processes, i.e., strategies of identity consolidation, aimed 
at building a sense of solidarity and common identity among the population (ibid.: 
3–4). As containers of symbolism that give expression to different parameters of 
symbolic nation-building – ethnic and religious culture, geographical and historical 
imagination (ibid.: 13) – and, as sites of ceremonies and rituals, material, symbolic 
and functional lieux de mémoire (Nora, 1989: 18), monuments are an indispensable 
part of nation-building processes.
Unlike in the other Yugoslav successor states, where strategies of identity con-
solidation are carried out on the state level, since the majority of population in 
them are “titular”, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the construction of shared identities 
is fragmented between the three “constituent” peoples, narodi or ethno-national 
groups, with two being related to their “outside motherlands”, Serbia and Croatia, 
and one to the state. Thus, according to Kolstø and Jelovica, more than one nation-
building project can be identified in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kolstø and Jelovica, 
2014: 242): 1) Bosniak, which is connected to the state but includes only one ethno-
national group and is concentrated mostly in one part of the country, the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2) Serb, a nation-building process of the Republic 
of Srpska (RS – Republika Srpska), seen as a state of its own; and 3) Croat, which 
can be associated with the calls of Croat leaders for a third entity. In this multi-
layered, nonlinear nation-building framework, with a very complex memory land-
scape, what is very prominent is what Jan Assmann, listing the functions of cultural 
memory, calls “concretion of identity”, “a kind of identificatory determination in 
a ‘positive’ (we are this) or a ‘negative’ (that is our opposite) sense” (1995: 130). 
Portraying mutually exclusive narratives of the past, war monuments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina do not only show self-images of one group but also that of the enemy, 
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which, according to Assmann, can take dangerous forms. In the paper, after a gene-
ral overview of the memorialization process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its politi-
cal and legal framework, I will focus on war monuments and narratives of the three 
ethno-national groups and give some examples of monuments that represent the 
fourth, civic, or what I will call here “unconstituent” narrative, which is very rare 
and marginal and based on civic-state identification.
Postwar Memorialization Process
Strategies of Memory Politics
As regime changes are usually followed by changes in memory politics, in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina there were a number of nationalist “responses” or “strategies” 
(Dragićević Šešić, 2011: 31–46). The first strategy was the destruction of the com-
mon communist past and pre-war collective memory or the appropriation of the 
memory of the antifascist struggle for the current prevailing ethno-national ideolo-
gies (Karačić, 2012: 17–90). The second was the destruction of all the traces of non-
Bosniak, non-Serb or non-Croat elements on ethnically cleansed territories, which 
before the war were ethnically mixed, targets of which were especially religious ob-
jects (Riedlmayer, 1995: 7–11; 2007: 107–132). And the third strategy, the subject 
of this article, was the construction of a new memory, or rather three “constituent” 
memories, based on the nationalist, mutually exclusive Bosniak, Serb and Croat 
narratives of the last war and newly-created or revived ethno-national myths, within 
which prewar events and figures also gained new interpretation (for example Gavri-
lo Princip or Draža Mihailović). Within the three nation-building projects, the last 
war is a “foundational myth”, which, twisted and loaded with old myths and “usable 
pasts” (Smith, 1997: 37) employed in the construction of war narratives, was used 
to legitimize the new ethno-national regimes. In Smith’s words, “[i]n order to create 
a convincing representation of the ‘nation’, a worthy and distinctive past must be 
rediscovered and appropriated. Only then can the nation aspire to a glorious destiny 
for which its citizens may be expected to make some sacrifices” (ibid.: 36). Just as 
tales of glory from distant historical pasts and those of injustices from the Second 
World War were used for the mobilization of masses at the beginning of the 1990s, 
the war dynamics of 1992–1995 were crucial for the consolidation of postwar iden-
tities and stabilization of new regimes. These strategies were followed and support-
ed by changes in urban spaces: streets and squares gained new names, mostly from 
heroic pasts, new mosques and churches were built – as religion is the main pillar 
of identity differentiation, even if religious practices have become largely irrelevant 
(Kolstø, 2014: 6) – and in almost every municipality a monument or a memorial 
plaque dedicated to military and civilian victims of one ethno-national group of the 
war of 1992–1995 was erected. Monuments have a number of functions in public 
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spaces: to mark whose territory it is, to demarcate the territory, to tell the official 
narrative of the majority population of one area, to transfer the narrative (in public 
spaces the narrative is easily transferred to the public), to demonstrate power, to 
give the illusion of creating something for eternity, to provoke the other, or to repel 
the other (Dragićević Šešić, 2011: 33).
All over the country, monuments which emphasized religious and emotional 
elements have been built near the locations of atrocities, in school yards, in cen-
tral squares, in front of public institutions, and in places of burial, while memorial 
plaques can be seen on the walls of religious, educational, residential, and govern-
ment buildings. They are not as “glorious” and monumental as those built in former 
Yugoslavia; many were hastily erected during or immediately after the war with the 
task “to remember and never forget”. However, in the last decade there have been a 
number of monuments with artistic and architectural value, and many are planned 
for the upcoming years. Most of the monuments in the RS (Republic of Srpska), 
which has centralized and coordinated memory politics, are dedicated to the Army 
of the Republic of Srpska (VRS – Vojska Republike Srpske) and Serb civilian vic-
tims, while in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where memory politics 
differs between cantons and even towns depending whether Bosniaks or Croats are 
in majority, monuments commemorate the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armi-
ja Bosne i Hercegovine, ABiH), the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijeće od-
brane, HVO), and Bosniak and Croat civilian victims. 
Political and Legal Framework
The reason for the existence of the three official and mutually exclusive narratives 
within the borders of one small state can be found in the fact that the war ended 
without victorious and defeated sides. Thus, there was no winning side to impose 
one official narrative or collective memory, as there was, for example, in Croatia. 
Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats have different views regarding “who lost and who won 
the war”, where each group sees itself as the victim. Three conflicting interpreta-
tions of wartime events and the roles played by the military forces in the conflict ex-
ist, within which the main argument is “our people were fighting a defensive war”. 
According to the study of Ronald Kostić, each ethno-national group considers its 
army formation as the defender; the majority of Croats and Bosniaks characterize 
the war as aggression, while Serbs regard it as a civil war (2012: 655–657). More-
over, the externally negotiated peace talks, the Dayton Peace Accords, left Bos-
nia and Herzegovina a decentralized country without any power over the memory 
discourse or nation-building process. The country lacks one state-level law that 
would control the erection of monuments. Instead, the process is based on the laws 
of the two entities, the cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
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the Brčko District, but experience has shown that the erection of war monuments 
usually entirely depends on the willingness of the local administration to grant the 
necessary permits (Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice, 2012: 61–64). One 
of the only two state laws that address the issue of memorialization is Article 20 of 
the Law on Missing Persons (Zakon o nestalim osobama), which gives the families 
of missing persons or their associations the right to request that locations of buri-
als and exhumations, individual or joint, be marked, contingent on approvals from 
the Missing Persons Institute and the local government (Institut za nestale osobe, 
2004). The other law is the Criteria for School Names and Symbols (Kriteriji za 
školske nazive i simbole), according to which eligible school symbols are war me-
morial plaques with the names of those who were killed, the year of birth and the 
year of suffering and that do not contain interpretations and qualifications of the 
war, as well as memorials that are free of offensive and unacceptable messages. 
However, an analysis of the implementation of this law from 2008 confirmed that it 
is not respected and that 556 schools in the country (about 27 per cent of the total) 
have disputed symbols that are mostly related to the memorials to fallen soldiers 
from the last war (Fondacija lokalne demokratije, 2008: 29).
Dissonant Memories and the Cult of Victimhood
The uncoordinated approach to memorialization and the malfunctioning legal 
framework create a situation in which, on the one hand, the majority group in one 
local community has the “liberty” to commemorate only their victims and their 
military formations, only those aspects that are part of their ethno-national nar-
ratives, and disregard facts that could mar the image of freedom-fighters and vic-
tims of historical injustices. On the other hand, minority groups or the “Others” 
are not allowed to mark the places of their suffering even if war crimes have been 
documented by numerous national and international actors, including the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). One well-known case 
is the Omarska mine near Prijedor, where the surviving inmates of the Omarska 
concentration camp are still waiting for the construction of a memorial center and 
the exhumation of missing persons. The place where the camp was located is now 
held by the steel giant ArcelorMittal, further complicating the situation (Vulliamy, 
2012). Thus, “too much memory” in Bosnia and Herzegovina is followed by col-
lective amnesia, not only regarding the communist past and the marginalization of 
the common Yugoslav history, but also, and especially so, regarding the atrocities 
committed by all the groups in the last war. Ernest Renan’s famous lecture on what 
keeps a nation together still holds true: it is not only the will to remember, but also 
the will to forget, a crucial factor in the creation of a nation. A certain denial about 
the events of the past is present on all levels of Bosnian and Herzegovinian society, 
as Tepić writes: 
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Denial of certain facts from the 1992-1995 conflict, or the creativeness of inter-
pretation to include negation, is furthermore connected to the culture of victim-
hood in BiH, whereby ‘everybody wants to be a victim’. Such victimhood, at the 
(ethnic) group level and individual level, implies denial of the Other. It is impor-
tant for people to present themselves as the ones who were on the ‘right’ side, 
which removes any (collective) guilt and attempts to evade being marked as an 
aggressor by others (2012: 22). 
Dissonant memories within one ethnically cleansed territory are not given 
space and when they are, monuments to different narratives are usually erected in 
peripheral or secluded areas, in places with a high number of returnees, such as in 
Kozarac near Prijedor (Irwin and Šarić, 2010) or due to pressures of the internation-
al community – as in the case of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center (Duij-
zings, 2007: 165). However, they have different significance for different groups: to 
some they are sacred, to others blasphemous. The meaning of monuments for every 
ethno-national group is constructed by their own ethno-national understanding of 
the past. As Assmann, referring to Maurice Halbwachs, writes: 
Cultural memory works by reconstructing, that is, it always relates its knowledge 
to an actual and contemporary situation. True, it is fixed in immovable figures of 
memory and stores of knowledge, but every contemporary context relates to these 
differently, sometimes by appropriation, sometimes by criticism, sometimes by 
preservation or by transformation (1995: 130). 
What can be observed in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian context is that differ-
ent meanings of one monument especially intensify, become prominent and even 
more contrasting when that particular monument and its content are verbally and 
even physically attacked, usually by the other group. In these situations, ethno-na-
tional sentiments rise and the need to defend one’s own nation and its rights becomes 
very prominent, which can also lead to mass protests. Following the protests by lo-
cal Serbs during the monument crisis in Višegrad, local police removed the term 
genocide from a monument for Bosniak victims on the Stražište Muslim Ceme-
tery, which had been erected in May 2012 (Džidić, 2014; Jukić, 2012). While Serbs 
claim that no verdict proved that genocide was committed in Višegrad and that the 
term is only another way to negatively portray the Serb nation, Bosniaks see the 
forced removal of the word genocide as a denial of the crimes committed against 
them. This and similar incidents of the “war on memory”, prove that war monu-
ments are not meaningless and unnoticeable structures in public spaces but relevant 
and sacred lieux de mémoire that have the potential to arouse different sentiments, 
pride, sadness and anger, and, as such, are powerful and even dangerous tools in the 
hands of the ethno-national regimes. 
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The Three Ethno-national Narratives
The Bosniak-Bosnian Identity Dilemma
During the 1990s, there was a “catching up” of Bosniak nation-building. Unlike the 
much older Serbian ethno-national myths, the Bosniak narrative and ethno-nation-
al symbols were mostly developed in this period. Elma Hašimbegović and Darko 
Gavrilović speak about the role of historians such as Mustafa Imamović and Enver 
Imamović in the development of the stories and myths about the Bosnian Muslims 
as the chosen people and the oldest native inhabitants of the country (Hašimbegović 
and Gavrilović, 2011: 29). In particular, the latter is accredited for introducing the 
symbol of the golden lily, fleur-de-lis, into the public discourse in the 1990s, trac-
ing its origin back to a special endemic subspecies lilium bosniacum, a flower that 
grows only in the mountains of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that it pre-
dates the Middle Ages (ibid.: 30). 
Another part of history that has been revived is the medieval period, particu-
larly focused on the heretical Bosnian Church, traditionally connected to Bogo-
mils, who were neither Catholics nor Orthodox and thus are very convenient for 
the Bosniak nation-building process (ibid.: 27–28). All these elements were very 
visible in the web propaganda materials for the first postwar census of 2013 which 
urged people to declare themselves Bosniaks, mainly through initiatives such as 
Bitno je biti Bošnjak (It is important to be Bosniak) and Ja sam Bošnjak, vjera mi 
je Islam, jezik mi je bosanski (I am a Bosniak, my religion is Islam, my language is 
Bosnian). Videos with citations from different historical periods were very popular 
and circulated on the Internet and social networks (Bitno je biti Bošnjak). The fact 
that the historical citations in the videos used the term Bosniak was interpreted as 
a proof that this particular group has always existed, and the quotes were followed 
by images of lilies, medieval knights, warriors, stećci (medieval tombstones), and 
historical persons such as Husein Gradaščević, a general who fought against the 
Ottomans, with images of dragon that allude to him (he is often referred to “Zmaj 
od Bosne”, “the Dragon of Bosnia”). Bosniak intellectuals and religious leaders, 
such as Sejfudin Tokić and Muhamed Filipović, also took part. The latter claimed 
that without the “autochthonous” Bosniak people, Bosnia and Herzegovina would 
not exist, and that for hundreds of years they had not been allowed to be called by 
their real name, Bosniak, for which they had to pay a high price: the war. To de-
clare themselves Bosnians instead of Bosniaks, which he called the “false Bosniak 
dilemma”, was not just a reflection of their fear due to constant persecution but also 
an attempt to bring into question the existence of the Bosniak people, and also of the 
whole country (Filipović, 2013). Indeed, before the census of 2013, the terms Bos-
niak and Bosnian, which had historically been interchangeable, became a subject 
of ardent debates. According to the postwar Constitution and the official narratives, 
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the first term denotes one of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, and thus pertains to the ethno-national domain; its members in the Socialist Fe-
deral Republic of Yugoslavia initially were treated as a religious group, they could 
declare themselves as Croatian Muslims, Serbian Muslims, and even Yugoslavs. 
Only later were they recognized first as an ethnic group, in the 1960s, and then as a 
nation, called Muslim, in 1971 (Friedman, 1996: 143–175). The second term, Bos-
nian, is used either or both to indicate a territorial belonging, thus can be used with 
the ethno-national terms (for example, a Bosnian Serb or a Bosnian Croat, to differ-
entiate them from those in the “outside motherlands”), or to denote a civic nation, 
regardless of ethnicity and religious denomination. However, this is not recognized 
by the Constitution and, furthermore, is negated by many, particularly by Bosniak 
intellectuals (Filipović, 2013). 
In the Bosniak narrative, this dilemma is a result of constant oppression, which 
culminated in the last war, seen as aggression against the sovereign state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and a genocidal act against the Bosniak people (Moll, 2013: 914; 
Ljubojević et al., 2011: 75). This narrative is the most complex and contradictory 
due to its dual or ambiguous image: on the one hand, it is based on the historical 
continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the ABiH is depicted as the only 
military formation that fought for the multinational state (Hoare, 2014). On the 
other hand, religious ceremonies, the exclusion of the victims of other ethnicities 
and the involvement of the Islamic community in the memorialization process give 
the image of a separatist, exclusively Islamic/Bosniak discourse. Bosniak monu-
ments, erected during or after the war usually in the form of memorial plaques with 
the names of the killed (in the Islamic tradition there are no shapes and images of 
bodies), also have this dual image, which can be interpreted from their symbols. 
The symbol of fleur-de-lis in the Bosniak narrative represents a historical, secu-
lar image of Bosnia and Herzegovina and has to validate the continuity of Bosnian 
statehood, while the Islamic religious symbols of the crescent moon and star and 
texts from Koran demonstrate the central role of religion for the Bosniak identity. 
This is especially the case with the monuments dedicated to the Bosniak military 
casualties, called šehidi, a term that dates back from the Ottoman period but which 
gained prominence during the war (Bougarel, 2007). According to the dictionary of 
Turkish loanwords in the Serbo-Croatian language, šehid means: “a Muslim who 
with heroic death dies in the fight for faith; someone innocently killed; a martyr” 
(Škaljić, 1996: 683).
According to Bougarel, the widespread use of this term “during the war does 
not constitute a mere ‘awakening’ of the tradition but one aspect of nation-building 
and reislamicization processes initiated by the SDA [Stranka Demokratske Akcije, 
a Bosniak political party] and the Islamska zajednica [the Islamic community]” 
(2007: 186). In the Bosniak memory discourse, important places of memory are 
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cemeteries for the killed soldiers of the ABiH, which nurture the story of heroic 
fighters who gave their lives in defense of the country; in Sarajevo, the central 
memory site is the graveyard Kovači, the old Ottoman graveyard from the fifteenth 
century (Čusto, 2013: 90–96). The tombstones for the soldiers killed in the last 
war were standardized in 1996 and their shape, based on the Ottoman tombstones 
nišani and the medieval stećci (Lovrenović, 2001: 69–78; Malcolm, 2011: 62–108) 
with fleur-de-lis, the Muslim religious symbols of the crescent and star, and texts 
from Koran, are an emblematic representation of the Bosniak postwar ideology 
(Čusto, 2013: 88). By using fleur-de-lis (ancient period), stećak (medieval period), 
and nišan (Ottoman period), the historical continuity of Bosnian statehood is em-
phasized, but religious elements stress that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country of 
Muslim/Bosniak people, and according to Amra Čusto, tell that its defense was also 
a defense of Islam (2013: 90). Even though there were Catholic and Orthodox mem-
bers of the ABiH, especially at the beginning of the war, today they are buried on 
different sites and commemorated on different days (on religious holidays). Mus-
lim/Bosniak soldiers (šehidi) are commemorated on the second day of Eid al-Fitr (a 
Muslim holiday that marks the end of Ramadan), Catholics (branitelji, defenders) 
on 1 November (All Saints Day), and Orthodox (poginuli borci, killed soldiers) on 7 
January (the Orthodox Christmas Day), regardless of whether or not they practiced 
religion (Čusto, 2013: 94). 
The secular symbol of fleur-de-lis can also be seen as exclusively Bosniak 
since largely only this group identifies with it. As previously stated, this symbol was 
popularized during the war and Serbs and Croats generally view it negatively on the 
flag of the ABiH. According to the IPSOS opinion survey conducted in 2011, 75 per 
cent of Serbs identify the coat of arms with six lilies with the ABiH rather than with 
the medieval coat of arms of Bosnian rulers (IPSOS, 2011: 28). Sixty-three per cent 
of Bosnians (the survey under this term includes both Bosniaks and Bosnians) be-
lieve that lilies can represent the history of all the Bosnian people regardless of eth-
nicity, while only 12 per cent of Serbs and 27 per cent of Croats believe so (IPSOS, 
2011: 27). The symbol of fleur-de-lis can be seen also on monuments and memorial 
plaques dedicated to civilian victims and those built by private initiatives (i.e., not 
state-sponsored). Standardized memorial plaques were erected in 1996 in Sarajevo 
marking the places with the largest number of atrocities (in the streets of Ferhadija 
and Dobrinja). They have the coat of arms with six lilies on the upper edge and the 
inscription: “In this place, Serb evil-doers (date) killed (number) of the citizens of 
Sarajevo. Let the dead rest in peace, recite Al-Fatiha and say a prayer, remember 
and admonish. The Citizens of Sarajevo.” 
These memorial plaques depict the other component of the Bosniak narrative: 
the image of the enemy. Although on the one hand, the need to name the perpetra-
tors is significant, the term Serb evil-doers or criminals (zločinci) gives room for the 
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generalization of the guilt as the collective guilt of one nation and causes discontent 
among Serbs, who see these symbols as another way to depict the Serb nation as 
the evil one (Bajić, 2011). The inscription on the memorial plaque at the entrance 
of the recently reconstructed Vijećnica, the National and University Library of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina uses the same term, demonstrating that this practice has not 
been abandoned. The inscription in English reads: “On this place Serbian criminals 
in the night of 25/26 August 1992 set fire to the National and University Library 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina; over 2 million books, periodicals and documents va-
nished in the flames. Do not forget; remember and admonish!” The Vijećnica was 
reopened on 9 May, Victory over Fascism Day as well as the Day of Europe (Jukić, 
2014), connecting the Bosniak narrative not only to the European one, but also to 
the antifascist struggle of the Second World War. This strategy has also been used 
in other Bosniak commemorations and memory initiatives, such as the Day of Sa-
rajevo, 6 April, marking both the liberation of the city in 1945 and the beginning of 
the siege in 1992 (Čusto, 2013: 109). On that day government representatives visit 
monuments from both wars, lay flowers and even pray the El-Fatiha, shifting the 
re-islamization process not only to the memory of the last war but also to the Se-
cond World War. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the Vijećnica, the chair of 
the tripartite presidency, Bakir Izetbegović, said that the restoration symbolized 
how Sarajevo had survived the horrors of the war and that they were sending a 
message of peace from multiethnic, European Sarajevo (Jukić, 2014). Although 
represented as multiethnic and inclusive, the Bosniak nation-building project with 
its religious practices and symbols excludes other groups and gives the image of an 
exclusively Islamic/Bosniak narrative.
The Serb Liberation Wars
While Bosnians, according to the IPSOS survey, consider both their ethnic identity 
and their identity as citizens of the country important, 67 per cent of Serbs distin-
guish their ethnic identity as primary (IPSOS, 2011: 82). Fifty-two per cent of Serbs 
feel they have more in common with the members of the same ethnicity living out-
side the country (IPSOS, 2011: 88) and 78 per cent identify their national symbols 
to be the same as those of Serbia (IPSOS, 2011: 89). Although symbols, ethnic-
ity and historical imagination are largely connected with Serbia, the geographi-
cal imagination and the recent past are more focused in the Republika Srpska. As 
Nicholas Moll writes, 
neither Yugoslavia nor Serbia constitutes the major reference in current Bosnian 
Serb memory and identity constructions. Instead, this place is reserved for Repub-
lika Srpska – as part of the Serb nation, but essentially as a state of its own. The 
creation of Republika Srpska in 1992 is systematically presented as an absolutely 
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necessary step in protecting the Serb population and their interests in BiH (2013: 
917). 
This is also proved by the fact that according to the same survey more Serbs 
want the Republika Srpska to become independent rather than to become part of 
Serbia (IPSOS, 2011: 44). Thus, even if the narrative is the same as that of the 
“outside motherland” (Čolović, 2002), the nation-building project of the Republika 
Srpska is still a separate process; it is, according to Kolstø and Jelovica, a project 
“inside the other in matroshka-doll fashion... and the inner is doing its utmost to es-
cape” (Kolstø and Jelovica, 2014: 242). 
In the official discourse of the Republika Srpska, the last war is called the De-
fense-Patriotic War (odbrambeno-otadžbinski rat), a war for the survival of the Serb 
nation. Ana Ljubojević, Darko Gavrilović, and Vjekoslav Perica state that the first 
to adopt the Homeland Concept, whose main “designer” was the former president 
of Croatia Franjo Tuđman, were the Bosnian Serbs under the leadership of Radovan 
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (Ljubojević et al., 2012: 74). Although this concept has 
been used by all the three warring sides, in the Serb narrative it goes beyond the 
1990s, as exemplified by the Law on Monuments and Memorial Plaques of the Li-
beration Wars (Zakon o spomenicima i spomen obilježjima oslobodilačkih ratova). 
The law, aimed at the protection and preservation of important monuments for the 
Serb nation, includes monuments and memorial plaques dedicated to the Serb and 
Montenegrin armies up to 1918, to the members of the antifascist struggle in the 
Second World War and to the soldiers of the Defense-Patriotic War of the Republika 
Srpska. It controversially equalizes the three wars under the same term liberation 
wars and avoids mentioning the military formations in the Second World War, giv-
ing space to different interpretations. Within this narrative, the last war was a heroic 
defense of the Serb nation and the Republika Srpska by the VRS. 
In a number of towns in the Republika Srpska there are central monuments ded-
icated to the VRS, designed by the prominent Serbian sculptor Miodrag Živković, 
known for Partisan war monuments built in Yugoslavia, such as the monument for 
the Battle of Sutjeska in Tjentište (see Živković’s official website). His post-war 
works in Bosnia and Herzegovina include: the Monument to the Serbian Defend-
ers of Brčko (Spomenik srpskim braniocima Brčkog, 1997), the Monument to the 
Fighters of Bijeljina and Semberija in Bijeljina (Spomenik borcima Bijeljine i Sem-
berije, 1998), the Monument for the Honorable Cross in Prijedor (Spomenik za 
Krst časni, 2000), the Monument to the Soldiers of the Fatherland War in Der-
venta (Spomenik borcima Otadžbinskog rata, 2002), the Monument to the Soldiers 
of the Fatherland in Mrkonjić Grad (Spomenik borcima Otadžbine, 2002), and the 
Monument to the Fighters for Freedom in Modriča (Spomenik borcima za slobodu, 
2002). These four- to seven-meter-high monuments are usually erected in central 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2014, pp. 105-126
116
squares, making them easily accessible to the public and tell the official narrative 
of the Republika Srpska. They are usually in the shape of a cross, demonstrating 
the important role of religion and the Orthodox Church within the Serbian memory 
discourse and identity consolidation. Bodies of soldiers are often placed inside or 
on the cross, symbolizing martyrdom and sacrifice. Some carry the Serbian symbol 
with four Cyrillic letters “S” that is popularly interpreted as “Only Unity Saves the 
Serb” (Samo sloga Srbina spašava), with inscriptions in the Cyrillic script, which is 
also an important ethno-national element. 
Živković’s biography speaks about the changes in memory politics in the area 
of former Yugoslavia, but also about the equalization of the antifascist struggle of 
the Second World War and the Serb Defense-Patriotic War. The first plays an im-
portant part in the Serb post-war narrative; the memory of the Serb suffering from 
the Second World War has been revived and monuments to the Serb victims of the 
Ustaša regime have been built. For example, a monument and a memorial chapel 
built in Stari Brod, near Višegrad, in the memory of 6,000 Serb victims from east-
ern Bosnia killed by the Ustaše in 1942, also depicts the “martyr” death of Milica 
Rakić, a three-year-old girl from Batajnica who died during the NATO bombing in 
1999 (Kusmuk, 2012). Serb suffering in the Second World War is symbolized by 
the Donja Gradina Memorial Park, which is described as the “[...] largest killing site 
of Serbian people, which is a part of the Jasenovac concentration camp established 
by the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during the Second World War” (Donja 
Gradina Memorial Park). Sometimes memorials to Serb victims of 1992–1995 are 
erected in the vicinity of Partisan monuments (Karačić, 2012: 57–58). In the village 
of Kravice, near Srebrenica, for example, a memorial complex is dedicated both to 
the victims of the Second World War and those of the war of the 1990s. This monu-
ment is also an example of counter-memorials or oppositional memorials to the 
narratives of the Bosniak side (Duijzings, 2007: 162–163). In Kravice annual com-
memorations are held on 12 July, the day after the commemoration of the victims 
in Srebrenica, which speaks about its oppositional nature not only to the Bosniak 
narrative but also to the narrative of the international community that had a crucial 
role in the establishment of the memorial center and in the recognition and com-
memoration of the genocide. 
This “rebellious” attitude was also demonstrated in the commemoration of the 
100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. In Sarajevo, 
the international community commemorated the event with a solemn, EU-spon-
sored concert by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra in the restored Vijećnica, while 
a performance of “A century of peace after the century of wars” was staged on the 
Latin bridge by the Bosnian film director Haris Pašović. In contrast, a day earlier 
officials in East Sarajevo unveiled a two-meter high bronze statue of Gavrilo Prin-
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cip (Čerkez, 2014). In Višegrad, on the streets of Emir Kusturica’s newly-opened 
theme park dedicated to the novelist Ivo Andrić, “Andrićgrad”, a reconstruction of 
the assassination was staged, entitled Pobunjeni anđeli (Rebel Angels). The mem-
bers of Mlada Bosna, responsible for the assassination, were represented as angels, 
and the last act was dedicated to the Serb victims of the First World War (Scenski 
prikaz sarajevskog atentata “Pobunjeni anđeli”). During the ceremony of the 100th 
anniversary of the assassination, Serbian writer Matija Bećković stated that St. Vi-
tus Day (28 June) “is a Serbian holiday for eternity, that day is everything that we 
celebrate, and that is that the Church is one roof, Vitus one day, Kosovo one field 
and the peony one flower” (Kusturica, 2014). According to Serbian myth, after the 
Battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1389, peonies started growing and became red from 
the blood of the fallen heroes, spreading all over Serbia. The importance of the 
Kosovo myth (Bieber, 2002) is present in the commemorations of the last war: the 
saint’s day of the Republika Srpska’s armed forces is the same as the commemora-
tion of the Battle of Kosovo, linking the modern-day army to the historical resis-
tance against the Turks.
The Croat Homeland War
The Croat practice regarding the memory of the Second World War and the Yugo-
slav period is different from that of the Bosniak and Serb ones: in several Bosnian 
towns with Croat majorities, Partisan monuments have been destroyed, a practice 
that has been common also in Croatia, due to the fact that the current narrative 
there portrays the Yugoslav period as Serbian hegemony and oppression against the 
Croatian people, but also due to the negative legacy of the Ustaša regime (Karačić, 
2012: 26–29). According to Vjeran Pavlaković, the last war in this narrative is the 
fulfillment of the hundred-years-old dream for independence of the Croatian people 
(2014). However, for the Croats within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it 
has different connotations. With its specific elements, calls for a third entity and 
negative loyalty towards the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kolstø and Jelovica, 
2014: 242), there is a specific identity consolidation of Croats within the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can take forms of a quasi-nation-building 
project. Croatia still has a strong influence over this process: in the census of 2013, 
the State Office for Croats Outside Croatia (Državni ured za Hrvate izvan Hrvatske) 
called Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina who live in Croatia and outside to de-
clare themselves as both Croats and Catholics who speak the Croatian language, in 
order to ensure the equal position of Croats within Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sjauš, 
2013).
The present struggle of the Croat people for their rights within the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the main elements of the Croat narrative. 
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The other is the concept of the Homeland War, with which Tuđman tried to justify 
the just and defensive character of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 
(Ljubojević et al., 2007: 70). Although the war discourse and symbols associated 
with it are the same as the discourse in Croatia – according to the IPSOS survey 84 
per cent of Croats see their symbols as those of their “outside motherland” (IPSOS, 
2011: 89) – there are still elements that are essentially “Bosnian Croatian”. Dates 
that are celebrated in the Croat memory politics, which is part of the diverse and 
fragmented memory landscape in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are 
18 November, when in 1991 Bosnian Croats proclaimed the Croat Community of 
Herceg-Bosna, and 28 August, when in 1993 the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna 
was established (Moll, 2013: 920). Another element that is specific to Bosnian Cro-
ats is the revival of the history of the Bosnian medieval period and of historical per-
sonalities such as the medieval Bosnian Queen Katarina Kosača and Duke Stjepan 
Kosača. While in the Bosniak version the main element of the medieval period is 
focused on Bogomils, “ancestors of the Bosniaks”, in the Croat version it is mainly 
based on Catholicism and anti-Ottomanism. The Croat positive attitude towards the 
medieval past of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen from the IPSOS survey in 
which 67 per cent of Croats believe that stećci can represent the history of all the 
Bosnian people (IPSOS, 2011: 27), while 59 per cent of them stated that the coat 
of arms with six lilies reminds them of the Bosnian medieval rulers (King Tvrtko I 
Kotromanić and others) (IPSOS, 2011: 28). 
However, this positive attitude is connected with an exclusivist approach to 
cultural heritage since 62 per cent declared that Muslims cannot identify with the 
medieval, pre-Ottoman, Christian past and symbols (IPSOS, 2011: 112). The “war 
on memory” is visible not only in the struggles for “ownership” of history and his-
torical figures, but also over urban spaces. This conflict is most extreme in the di-
vided city of Mostar, where architecture is visibly used for the imposition of ideolo-
gies and reinforcement of identities, an aspect that has been researched by Emily 
Gunzburger Makaš (2007). The statue of the Bosnian medieval Queen Katarina 
Kosača and of the Croatian poet Marko Marulić from Split are, indeed, placed on 
the Square of Great Croats (Trg velikih Hrvata), the former Rondo Square, in the 
Croatian part of Mostar, where the Duke Stjepan Kosača Croatian Center (Dom 
Hercega Stjepana Kosače), a former communist cultural center, is located (ibid.: 
276–278). Queen Katarina Kosača, the poet Marko Marulić, and Duke Stjepan 
Kosača have anti-Ottoman symbolism, in contrast to the Old Bridge, which for 
many is a Muslim and Bosniak symbol, and not a symbol of multiethnic Mostar. 
The statues also symbolize the Croat cultural heritage that is connected to both 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The centuries-long presence of Croats in the 
area is represented by fourteen pillars (symbolizing fourteen centuries since Cro-
Sokol, A., War Monuments: Instruments of Nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina
119
ats migrated to the Balkans) on the Monument to the Fallen Croat Defenders of the 
Homeland War (Spomenik poginulim hrvatskim braniteljima domovinskog rata), 
designed by a sculptor from Croatia, Slavomir Drinković, and unveiled just two 
days before the city was united in 2004. A cross, usually connected with suffering 
and resurrection, passes through the monument, while a picture of pieta represents 
a mother mourning over a dying son/soldier (Gunzburger Makaš, 2007: 276–278). 
Even though a number of Bosniaks were members of the HVO at the beginning of 
the war, religious symbols exclude them from the Croat collective memory. 
The Croat struggle for memory spaces, a symbolic representation of their de-
mands for a third entity, have been followed by numerous controversies. One is the 
Jubilee Cross, built by the Diocese of Mostar, which overlooks the city and which 
according to Croats is a message of peace, but according to Bosniaks is a provoca-
tion. Or the bell tower at the mission church of the Franciscan Community of Her-
zegovina, which was reconstructed higher than the prewar one. Heated disputes be-
tween Croats and Bosniaks over memory spaces culminated with the destruction of 
the war monument of ABiH by a bomb in January 2013. The monument dedicated 
to all ABiH soldiers who were killed in the city was placed in April 2012 in front 
of the new building of the Mostar City Council without the permission of the local 
authorities. This monument was built after a monument to eight HVO soldiers from 
Livno, who died there in 1993, was erected by the Croat veteran association Zavjet, 
replacing a cross that stood there previously (Zuvela, 2013). Numerous accusations 
and heated debates in the media followed both actions, deepening the already exist-
ing divisions. 
The “Unconstituent” Narrative
The fourth narrative, which is very rare and marginal but is part of the multilayered 
memory landscape in the country, is the Bosnian civic or “unconstituent” narra-
tive that does not commemorate the war in an ethno-national way. Here I refer to 
the Bosnian civic nation, which is highly discussed, mostly negated and, as stated 
previously, not recognized by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is 
largely unacknowledged by the majority of the population: 79 per cent of Serbs and 
59 per cent of Croats negate the existence of the Bosnian nation, while 72 per cent 
Bosnians confirm it (IPSOS, 2011: 83), although, most of them, 82 per cent, de-
fine their identity in ethno-national terms, declaring themselves Bosniaks (IPSOS, 
2011: 15). However, it should be mentioned that the distinction between the two 
terms is not always clear; Bosniaks sometimes use the term Bosnian in the ethnic 
sense, thus distinguishing themselves from Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. For Serbs and Croats, however, the term Bosnian almost always refers to 
Bosnian Muslims, since their members rarely define their identity in relation to the 
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state. However, there is a growing tendency especially among young people, who 
do not feel they belong to any of the constitutionally defined ethno-national groups, 
to refuse the prevailing ethno-national identities. This tendency was visible in the 
campaigns before the census 2013 which called on people to declare themselves 
“unconstitutionally”, in protest against the ethno-national divisions of the country. 
“Be a Citizen Above All Else: For a Bosnia and Herzegovina Without Discrimina-
tion” (Budi građanin prije svega: Za Bosnu i Hercegovinu bez diskriminacije) was 
a campaign of “Coalition Equality” (Koalicija jednakost), a coalition of seventeen 
civil society organizations from both entities whose goal was the changing of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which only recognizes the three constitu-
ent groups (Terzić, 2013; Koalicija Jednakost). The coalition collected hundreds 
of photographs of people holding an inscription on which it was written citizen 
above all (Građanin/ka prije svega) and included well-known actors, film direc-
tors, journalists and professors, who voiced their disagreement with the discrimina-
tion against people not belonging to any the three categories (Koalicija Jednakost).
Refusing to accept one of the three ethno-national identities is also a form of 
protest against the ethno-national regimes and the leading political parties. These 
protests culminated in the social riots that spread in a number of cities in the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in February 2014, during which many called on the 
government to end the ethno-national narratives and concentrate instead on improv-
ing economic conditions. However, until the publication of the final results of the 
2013 census, the percentage of people who declared themselves in civic terms will 
remain unknown. The monuments connected to this concept can be described as 
“counter” monuments that refute the prevailing ethno-national narratives and give 
a more inclusive memory of the war. The Sarajevo Roses (Sarajevske ruže), shrap-
nel damage caused by mortar shells and later painted in red, can be seen as coun-
ter memorials because instead of interpreting a particular version of history, they 
are silent about the identity and ethnicity of both victims and perpetrators. Instead, 
they force passers-by to construct their own versions of the past (Ristić, 2013: 113–
117; Junuzović, 2006). The Monument to the International Community (Spomenik 
međunarodnoj zajednici), on the other hand, uses humor as a form of memory; it is 
in the shape of the can of Ikar beef, which was delivered as part of the humanitar-
ian assistance packages during the war (Krstanović, 2007), a memory shared by all 
regardless of ethnicity. Another example of the Bosnian civic or “unconstituent” 
narrative is the Slana Banja memorial complex in Tuzla where all the victims of 
the Kapija massacre of 25 May 1995 are buried. Radical nationalist politicians and 
religious leaders protested the common burial site of the seventy-one victims who 
were of different religious backgrounds. The only religious symbols on the graves 
are small silver medals under the photos of the deceased, which is a contrast to the 
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prominent religious symbols and shapes of the monuments of the prevailing narra-
tives. This practice stresses civic nationalism rather than ethnic, which can also be 
seen on monuments to the Second World War (Armakolas, 2011). Indeed, the city of 
Tuzla dedicated a new memorial space nearby – the Alley of Heroes (Aleja heroja) 
with busts of Partisan and socialist heroes – symbolically refuting the neglect of the 
common communist past (Armakolas, 2011). Thus, also within the civic narrative, 
the memory and heritage of the antifascist struggle is appropriated and connected 
with the war of 1992–1995 for the strengthening of a more inclusive and less ethni-
cally interpreted history.
Conclusion
In addition to providing knowledge about the past, public memorials should have a 
pedagogical function: to educate and stimulate dialogue so future generations can 
reinforce the culture of human rights and prevent the repetition of a traumatic past. 
However, in divided societies, memorials can be very dangerous, fortify divisions, 
and even provoke future conflicts. In fact, monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
construct and reinforce mutually exclusive narratives that are part of the ethno-na-
tional identities, and as such are instruments of identity building. Memory initia-
tives are very rarely directed towards civic nation-building that would include all 
the ethno-national groups. Instead, identity consolidation is carried out on the level 
of the ethno-national groups, within which monuments only serve to strengthen di-
visions. Thus, aside from attempts by some civil society organizations which aim 
to strengthen the civic Bosnian identity over the ethno-national identities, it is dif-
ficult to speak about strategies of identity consolidation on the state level. Instead, 
identity-building takes place in the entities (the Republika Srpska and the Fede-
ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina), cantons, and local levels, where the crucial 
roles are played by ethno-national regimes and the elites of the three prevailing 
groups. Although the Bosniak identity-building is connected to the state, still it is 
an ethnically-conceived nationhood and excludes other groups. When it comes to 
the Serb and Croat identity consolidation, their connection with the state is almost 
non-existent, which is demonstrated by their negative loyalty scores to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Kolstø and Jelovica, 2014: 242). Their wartime aims, unification with 
Serbia or Croatia, have been shifted towards the independence of Republika Srp-
ska, in the first case, and the creation of a third entity in the case of Bosnia’s Croats, 
within which specific nation-building projects are carried out. As part of these pro-
jects, monuments serve as flags that mark territories, i.e., ethnically homogenous 
political spaces that can guarantee safety and “hence proper democratic majority 
citizenship of the population” (Dević, 2014: 53). They are also used to provoke and 
repel. Many monuments, especially those dedicated to heroes of one ethno-national 
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group, who are seen as perpetrators by the other group, are regarded as provocations 
and halt the process of return of refugees and of the restoration of the multiethnic 
character of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the main aims of the Dayton Peace 
Accords. With the explicit naming of perpetrators, many monuments built from the 
bottom up also support the dominant ethno-national narratives, which according to 
experts can lead to future conflicts and revenge seeking. Although the three narra-
tives are mutually exclusive, the same strategies are employed in the construction 
of each one: the concept of the Homeland or Fatherland War, the exclusion of other 
groups, the cult of victimhood, religious symbols and ceremonies, and the connec-
tion to the Second World War atrocities and antifascist struggle. This last strategy is 
employed also in the civic narrative and identity-building, with the aim of empha-
sizing the common communist past, together with other memories shared by all the 
groups, such as the feeling of hunger during the war (The Monument to the Interna-
tional Community) and the current economic situation.
Dealing with the past is essential for Bosnia and Herzegovina and monuments 
play a very important role in this process. This is especially visible when it comes 
to the memory of the Second World War: suppressed memories from that period 
fueled hate and legalized the use of force at the beginning of the 1990s. One-sided 
interpretations of past events give distorted pictures about the conflict and the mes-
sage is usually that of division and accusation. The current situation regarding war 
monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very complex and is connected with the 
division that exists on all levels. A comprehensive legal framework is necessary for 
the regulation of the issue, but solutions that will satisfy all the sides are hard to 
reach. The question is, how to remember the war with three different versions of the 
past? Initiatives that do not commemorate victims in an ethno-national way can be 
a good step forward, but until now they have been very rare and marginal.
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